

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDE-00 ERDA-05

AF-08 ARA-06 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07 PM-04 H-02 INR-07

L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01

PRS-01 OES-06 SS-15 USIA-06 SAJ-01 NRC-05 /133 W

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2078

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 6827

DISTO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD, UR, US

SUBJ: CCD - US-SOVIET CW CONSULTATIONS

REF: GENEVA 6748

1. SUMMARY: SEVENTH SESSION OF US-SOVIET CW CONSULTATIONS
DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION AND HIGHLIGHTED BY
DETAILED SOVIET STATEMENT ON SUBJECT. END SUMMARY

2. AUGUST 25 SESSION BEGAN WITH DISCLAIMER BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR
LIKHATCHEV TO EFFECT THAT VIEWS EXPRESSED BY SOVIET EXPERTS AND
THEIR QUESTIONS REGARDING US SUGGESTED TECHNICAL METHODS OF
VERIFICATION DID NOT IMPLY SOVIET AGREEMENT WITH US APPROACH TO
PROBLEM. SOVIET EXPERT SOKOLSKIY FOLLOWED WITH PREPARED STATEMENT
REGARDING TECHNIQUES WHICH WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN VERIFICATION, BY
NATIONAL CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS, OF CW AGENT PRODUCTION BAN. STARTING
FROM PREMISE THAT CW AGENT PRODUCTION FACILITIES DID NOT DIFFER
EXTERNALLY, IN ANY MATERIAL WAY, FROM PLANTS ENGAGED IN
PRODUCTION OF CHEMICALS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND WERE OFTEN
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CO-LOCATED WITH THEM, HE POSITED TWO ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF

VERIFICATION, ONE FOR USE WHEN SUCH FACILITIES WERE STATE OWNED AND ONE FOR CASE IN WHICH CHEMICALS PRODUCED BY PRIVATE COMPANIES.

3. IN FIRST CASE, SOKOLSKIY REITERATED SOVIET POSITION THAT ACT OF ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION BY STATE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT GUARANTEE OF COMPLIANCE. HE SAID STATE ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR OWNERSHIP AND FINANCING FACILITY WOULD BEAR FIRST RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING AGAINST CLANDESTINE PRODUCTION. IN CASE OF PRIVATELY OWNED FACILITIES, SOKOLSKIY SAID FACT OF PRODUCTION WOULD BE KNOWN ONLY TO OWNERS AND THOSE DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN PRODUCTION SO STATE WOULD

BE ABLE TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE ONLY THROUGH ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION, SUCH AS NATIONAL CONTROL ORGANIZATION. SUCH ORGANIZATION WOULD ENSURE, BY BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT MEANS, THAT CLANDESTINE PRODUCTION DID NOT TAKE PLACE AND THAT DECOMMISSIONED FACILITIES WERE NOT REACTIVATED.

4. AS DIRECT MEANS OF CONTROL SOKOLSKIY SUGGESTED SAMPLING OF AIR, WATER AND SOIL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF FACILITY AND LABORATORY ANALYSIS OF SAMPLES. FOR INDIRECT CONTROL HE SUGGESTED COMPUTER ANALYSIS OF DATA CONCERNING FINANCES, RAW MATERIAL FLOWS, INVENTORIES,

PATENTS, PUBLICATIONS, ETC. HE SUGGESTED SUCH METHOD WOULD BE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN CASES OF FIRMS NOT VERTICALLY INTEGRATED. SOKOLSKIY STATED THAT SO-CALLED "CONSERVATIVE" VERIFICATION (I.E., SEALS, CAMERAS, ETC. SUGGESTED BY US) WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN CASE OF MOTH-BALLED FACILITIES, SAYING THAT THEIR EFFECTIVENESS WAS CONFIRMED BY SOVIET EXPERIENCE WITH "FIRE-FIGHTING, SANITARY AND MOUNTAIN" (SIC) ORGANIZATIONS. HE SAID IMPORTANT FEATURE OF SUCH MEANS WAS NECESSITY OF ON-SITE INSPECTION, BOTH TO INSTALL AND PERIODICALLY CHECK DEVICES. SOKOLSKIY CONCLUDED THAT SYSTEM SHOULD ENCOMPASS APPROPRIATE NATIONAL LEGISLATION, DIRECT AND INDIRECT METHODS OF VERIFICATION AND USE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION. HE SAID SUCH SYSTEM, IF ENTRUSTED TO NATIONAL CONTROL ORGANIZATION, COULD BOTH ENSURE COMPLIANCE AND ASSURE PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY SECRETS.

5. IN ANSWER TO SOVIET QUESTIONS OF PREVIOUS SESSION, US EXPERT (MIKULAK) SAID THAT, INsofar AS PROSPECT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIAL METHODS OF VERIFICATION OF PRODUCTION AND TESTING CONFIDENTIAL

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BAN WAS CONCERNED, US CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT FORESEEABLE LEVEL OF SENSOR TECHNOLOGY DID NOT OFFER ANY SIGNIFICANT PROSPECT OF USEFULNESS FOR SUCH PURPOSES. IN ANSWER TO SECOND SOVIET QUESTION AS TO WHETHER TECHNIQUES PROPOSED IN JUNE 1976 US WORKING PAPERS HAD BEEN TESTED AT CHEMICAL AGENT DESTRUCTION FACILITIES HE SAID THAT EQUIPMENT DEVELOPED FOR PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE AREAS AND EQUIPMENT COMMON TO MANY FIELDS AND CURRENTLY UNDERGOING TESTING IN NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

6. IN RESPONSE TO US QUESTIONS OF PREVIOUS SESSION SOKOLSKIY GAVE STATEMENT SAYING SOVIETS BELIEVED THAT WHILE TECHNICAL METHODS WERE NECESSARY TO CONFIRM INFORMATION REGARDING DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS, THEY WERE NOT ONLY, OR EVEN PRINCIPAL, METHODS. HE SAID PERSONNEL OF NATIONAL CONTROL ORGANIZATION SHOULD HAVE TO HAVE

RIGHT TO VISIT ANY FACILITY OR PART THEREOF AND HAVE ACCESS TO DOCUMENTATION. SOKOLSKIY SAID ACCESS RIGHTS OF CONTROL ORGANIZATION SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO SITE OF DESTRUCTION BUT THAT PERSONNEL SHOULD

HAVE RIGHT TO VERIFY SHIPMENT FROM STORAGE AREAS AND RECEIPT AT POINT OF DESTRUCTION/CONVERSION. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT NECESSITY TO PROTECT MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION, HE SAID SOVIETS BELIEVED SUCH RIGHTS COULD ONLY BE GIVEN TO NATIONAL BODY. SOKOLSKIY SAID CONTROL ORGANIZATION SHOULD HAVE RIGHT OF CHOICE OF METHODS OF VERIFICATION TO BE EMPLOYED. IN DISCUSSION OF FOREIGN OBSERVERS, SOKOLSKIY REPEATED THAT EVEN IN CASE OF AGENTS WHOSE CHEMICAL STRUCTURE WAS KNOWN, OBSERVERS WOULD GAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING ROLE AND PLACE OF AGENT WITHIN GIVEN STATE'S SYSTEM OF ARMAMENTS, THEREBY POSSIBLY LEADING TO PROLIFERATION.

7. INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION FOLLOWED US SUGGESTION THAT WE RESPOND POSITIVELY TO SWEDISH PROPOSAL THAT CO-CHAIRMEN TAKE LEAD IN ORGANIZING CW MATERIAL ALREADY BEFORE CCD. LIKHATCHEV SEEMED CURIOUSLY UNINSTRUCTED GIVEN FACT SOVIETS HAVE BEEN AWARE OF AGENDA FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. US SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE POLITIC TO INVITE PARTICIPATION OF SWEDISH EXPERT AS OFFERED BY SWEDISH AMBASSADOR, BUT THAT IT PREPARED TO GO EITHER WAY. LIKHATCHEV SEEMED RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT THIS DILUTION ROLE OF CO-CHAIRMEN, BUT SAID WOULD REPORT. HE THOUGHT THAT MOST HE WOULD BE ABLE TO DO BEFORE END OF SESSION WAS JOIN US IN GENERALIZED STATEMENT OF INTENT.

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8. US ALSO SUGGESTED THAT WE RESPOND TO JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTION OF TOXICITY SPECTRUM BY COOPERATING WITH JAPANESE AND BRITISH IN PREPARATION OF SUCH TABLE. LIKHATCHEV SAID HE WOULD BE UNABLE GET INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE END OF SESSION BUT SOVIETS WOULD BE IN TOUCH THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

9. FINAL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR MORNING AUGUST 27. CATTO

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Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 AUG 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
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Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: MartinML
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Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
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Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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